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Comments
CHANGES IN TORT CONFLICT OF LAWS IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
Problems of conflict of laws inhere in a federal system of government.
At an early date such issues were recognized as "the most embarrassing and
difficult of decision, that can occupy the attention of those who preside
in courts of justice."' Although about one case in one hundred involves a
conflicts question, the area attracts the attention of many capable legal
scholars.2 As a consequence, dynamic change has occurred in this field
during the last decade. Such a change recently manifested itself in Mis-
souri's tort choice of law.
When suit is brought in one state for a tort that occurred in another,
the court must determine which state's law to apply. Until recently, the
Missouri 3 and majority position4 allowed one to predict that the law of
the place of wrong (lex loci delicti) would control the parties' substan-
tive rights. Legal scholars5 and progressive courts6 criticized the rule. In
1969 the Missouri Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Dixon7 overturned a long
1. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. N-S 569, 571 (La. 1827).
2. Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DEr. L.J. 376
(19553". E.g., Neihardt v. Knipmeyer, 420 S.W.2d 27 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
4. In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1962), the Court stated:
The general conflict-of-laws rule, followed by a vast majority of the States,
is to apply the law of the place of injury to the substantive rights of the
parties.
5. See, e.g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L.
Rv. 173 (1933); Cheatham, Some Developments in Conflict of Laws, 17 VAND. L.
REv. 193 (1963); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLum. L.
REv. 959 (1952); Morris,,The Proper Law of Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv 881 (1951);
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. REv. 657 (1959); Wein-
traub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 ComRELL L.Q. 215 (1963).
It should be noted from the outset that the scholars are very influential in this
area of the law.
6. The following cases have recently abandoned the lex loci delicti doctrine:
Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441
P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968);
Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Fabricius
v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d
259 (Ky. 1967); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966);
Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30,
216 A.2d 781 (1966); Melk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Casey v.
Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1966); Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I.
290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d
617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
7. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
(268)
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TORT CONFLICT OF LAWS
line of precedent s by abandoning the lex loci delicti doctrine. Missouri
adopted the "most significant relationship test" of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws,9 thus abandoning an "isle of stability"'0 and embarking
on a voyage in an "uncharted sea."'1
This comment seeks to elucidate the changes caused by the Kennedy
decision in tort choice of law in Missouri. The three part analysis consists
of an overview of Missouri's tort choice of law prior to Kennedy, an ap-
praisal of the Restatement (Second) test as applied by the Missouri court,
and a projection of the impact of the decision on selected issues arising
within the context of a multi-state tort.
II. THm TRADrIONAL APPROACH
A. Lex Fori
The doctrine of lex fori (law of the forum) preceded lex loci delicti
as a tort choice of law formula. Throughout the United States the law of
the forum controlled all issues in a multi-state tort.12 The outstanding
characteristic of this local law theory was ease of application. Criticism of
this isolationist methodology centered around its refusal to recognize the
interests of other states.' 3 Today such an approach might violate the full
faith and credit' 4 or due process clauses15 of the United States Constitution.
B. Lex Loci Delicti
The trend towards lex loci delicti began in dicta in the 1880 case of
Dennick v. Central R.R.' 6 The eighth edition of Story's treatise on con-
flicts adopted the doctrine, giving the movement added impetus.17 In
the mid-1880's the Missouri courts abandoned lex fori and adopted lex
loci delicti.18
8. Cases cited note 74 infra.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 145 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)].
10. Northrip, Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases-A Coming Conflict in Mis-
souri, 33 Mo. L. Rzv. 81, 81 (1958).
11. Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1968).
12. In Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 37 Wis. 321, 322 (1875), the court
stated:
The action here is a personal action, for personal injury, governed by the
lex fori. This is almost too familiar a principle for discussion or authority.
18. Note, Conflict of Laws-Choice of Law Problems in Tort Cases-Automo-
bile Guest Statutes, 13 ST. L. L.J. 467, 469 (1969).
14. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
15. Id. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1. See Order of United Commercial Travelers
v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See
also Currie, The Constitution and Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958); Leflar, Constitutional Limits on
Free Choice of Law, 28 LAw & CONTEAp. PROB. 706 (1963); Weintraub, Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA
L. REv. 449 (1959).
16. 103 U.S. 11 (1880).
17. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFUCr OF L/ws (8th ed. 1883).
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The original Restatement of Conflict of Laws19 and Missouri courts20
adopted the views of Joseph Beale, the leading advocate of lex loci delicti.
Lex loci grew out of the vested rights doctrine, which called for universal
enforcement of rights created under a state's local law. Beale rationalized
that the cause of action originated in the state of the tort, hence vesting
rights in the injured party.2 1 Under the original Restatement22 and in
Missouri 23 the law of the "place of wrong" governed all substantive issues
relating to the existence of the claim.24 The "place of wrong" was the
"state where the last act necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort [took] place."2 5 In a multi-state tort this was the state where the
injury occurred.20
The logic of lex loci delicti possessed certain virtues. In a theoretical
sense the doctrine provided for certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result. No matter where a party sought to enforce a vested right the out-
come should be the same. Little danger of forum shopping existed in the
universal system. 27 The principle protected the reasonable expectations
19. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLIcr OF LAws §§ 377-97 (1934) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATmNT].
20. See RSrTATEmNT OF CONFLiCT OF LAWs, Missoux ANNOTATIONS §§ 377-97(1987).
21. See J. B.ALE, CONFLICT OF LAwS (1985).
22. RESTATE MENT §§ 577-97.
23. See Goodman v. McCulley, 367 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1963); Robinson v.
Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. En Banc 1960); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d
859 (Mo. En Banc 1958); Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 857 Mo. 1188, 212
S.W.2d 748 (1948); Root v. Kansas City S. Ry., 195 Mo. 348, 92 S.W. 621 (1906);
Fogarty v. Saint Louis Transfer Co., 180 Mo. 490, 79 S.W. 664 (1904); Neihardt
v. Knipmeyer, 420 S.W.2d 27 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Chapman v. Terminal Ry.
Ass'n, 187 S.W.2d 612 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940); Chandler v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry.,
127 Mo. App. 84, 106 S.W. 558 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907).
24. Thus, the lex loci delicti controlled state of mind, capacity to sue, motive,
surrounding circumstances, immunity from suit, contributory negligence, available
defenses, privilege, causation, existence of a cause of action and all other matters
inherent in act and injury which go to determine their legal characteristics.
25. Oblatore v. Brauner, 283 F. Supp. 761, 762 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Gaston v.
Wabash R.R., 322 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. En Banc 1959); RESTATMENT § 877. See
Hughes Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., 242 S.W.2d 285 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1951).
In Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App. 246, 180 S.W. 430
(Spr. Ct. App. 1910), a merchant in Oklahoma ordered several bottles of ginger
extract from a wholesale grocer in Missouri. The order was shipped from Missouri
to the Oklahoma merchant, who sampled the extract. As a consequence, the mer-
chant died. Held: The cause of action, if any, against the wholesaler for the death
of the merchant accrued in Oklahoma.
26. Redfield v. New York Cent. R.R., 83 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1936); Western
Newspaper Union v. Woodward, 183 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Electric
Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 118 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Mo.
1953); Tepel v. Thompson, 859 Mo. 1, 220 S.W.2d 28 (1949); Hughes Provision
Co. v. La Mear Poultry &c Egg Co., 242 S.W.2d 285 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951); Taylor
v. Integrity Mut. Cas. Co., 216 Mo. App. 599, 265 S.W. 881 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924);
Michael v. Kansas City W. Ry., 161 Mo. App. 53, 143 S.W. 67 (K.C. Ct. App.
1912). See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1266 (1932).
27. LaBrum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty, and
Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747, 748 (1968).
[Vol. 37
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of the parties.28 Since the forum usually deferred to the law of the place
of wrong, little danger of interstate judicial jealousy existed. Under lex
loci delicti it was easy to determine which law to apply,29 and the doctrine
did provide an arguably adequate choice of law formula.
These assertions may be challenged. While certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result are valid policies in a choice of law system,30 the just
resolution of individual cases should be paramount.31 Predictability aids
attorneys in facilitating settlement, but fails to help courts in properly
disposing of the issues.3 2 Adoption of the law of the locus delicti made ap-
plication (as opposed to selection) of the law difficult in that the court
was forced at times to grapple with an unfamiliar rule.33
Scholars criticized the mechanical and arbitrary nature of the rule.3 4
Under such a jurisdiction-selecting rule the content of the law only came
into play after the applicable law had been determined. Thus, lex loci
selected the applicable law without considering the content of the con-
tending rules, their suitability with regard to the relevant issues, or the
result of the controversy 3 5
The traditional doctrine utilized a package approach to choice of
law.36 In the tort context, choice of law issues usually arise with respect
to substantive issues other than the negligence of the parties. Lex loci
dictated the same applicable law for all torts and all substantive issues.3 7
It is inconceivable that a single choice of law doctrine could adequately
serve the wide range of tort issues.3 8
Although the original Restatement incorporated lex loci delicti, this
approach was inconsistent with the Restatement's basic statement of method:
Each court . . . derives [its choice of law rules] from the same
source for determining all its law: from precedent, from analogy,
from legal reason and from consideration of ethical and social
need.3 9
Experience demonstrated that the last event rule did not work well in
situations where the place of injury bore only a slight relationship to the
28. Cheatham 8 Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv.
959, 970-72 (1952).
29. Northrip, supra note 10, at 83.
30. See RESTATFMNT (Sucoun) § 6 (2)(f.
31. See Note, Conflict of Laws: The Adoption of the Most Significant Rela-
tionship Test in Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C. L. R.v. 457, 460 (1970).
32. Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1251, 1254 (1963).
33. Northrip, supra note 10, at 83.
34. See, e.g., Cheatham, Some Developments in Conflict of Laws, 17 VAND. L.
Ryv. 193 (1963); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. Rv.
657 (1959).
35. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HPARV. L. REv. 173,
178 (1933).
36. See note 24 supra.
37. Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603, 608 (1970).
38. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL
L. REv. 215, 216 (1963).
39. REsrATEMiENT § 5, comment b.
1972]
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occurrence and the parties regarding a certain issue.4 0 Its basic weakness
lay in the assumption that only one state had an interest in applying its
law.41 In many cases no one clearly demonstrable place of injury existed,
or in others, injury occurred in more than one state. Further, the place of
wrong of an unintentional tort is fortuitous; only by chance was the locus
delicti concerned at all, and only by chance did a court apply the most
appropriate rule of law.4 2
C. Escape Devices
Courts sought to mitigate the potentially harsh results of lex loci delicti
by resort to a number of escape devices.4 3 The frequently employed device
of characterization occurred at two levels. First, a court could utilize the
substance-procedure distinction. Although the law of the place of wrong
controlled all substantive tort issues, the original Restatement44 and Mis-
souri courts45 applied the law of the forum to matters of procedure. In
cases where the lex loci delicti would yield harsh or unjust results, a court
could characterize a seemingly substantive issue as procedural. This freed
the forum to apply its own law.46 Second, a court might resort to a non-
tort characterization, so that the choice of law rules of the characterized
area would apply.4 7 Certain courts displayed a marked tendency to resort
to characterization in difficult cases.48
Another main principle of escape stated that the lex fori controlled
if the lex loci delicti violated the strong public policy of the forum.4 9 As
a corollary, some courts refused to enforce the penal laws of other juris-
dictions. 50 This escape device lended itself as a substitute for well reasoned
analysis, and served as a guise to justify the application of local law. Argu-
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 413.
41. Note, supra note 13, at 469-70.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 413.
43. See R. LEFLAR, A.nucAN CONFLICrs LAW § 93 (1968); Cook, "Character-
ization" in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE L.J. 191 (1941); Lorenzen, The Qualifica-
tion, Classification, and Characterization Problem in Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J.
743 (1941); Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49 COLum. L. REv.
1027 (1949).
44. R STATEMENT § 585.
45. See Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1959); Russell
v. Kotsch, 336 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1960); Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo.
En Banc 1960); Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748
(1948); Neihardt v. Knipmeyer, 420 S.W.2d 47 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Scott v.
Jones, 334 S.W.2d 742 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960); Boneau v. Swift 8- Co., 66 S.W.2d
172 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934).
46. See, e.g., Noe v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo.
1966) (Louisiana direct action statute held procedural); Hopkins v. Kurn, 351
Mo. 41, 171 S.W.2d 625 (1943) (provision in Oklahoma Constitution that defense
of contributory negligence was a question of fact held procedural).
47. See, e.g., Garrison v. Ryno, 328 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1959) (tort/contract);
Williams v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 360 Mo. 501, 229 S.W.2d 1 (1950) (tort/contract).
48. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Mo. En Banc 1969) (dictum).
49. REsTATEMENT § 612. The foreign law had to dearly conflict with the law
of the forum and violate fundamental principles of justice.
50. E.g., Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127 (1953).
[Vol. 37
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ments of public policy appear when the law fails to keep pace with social
needs.51
The renvoi doctrine entailed looking to the whole law of the place of
wrong, including its choice of law rules.52 In the choice of law rules of the
locus delicti, the forum might find a reference back to its own law. The
renvoi concept encouraged uniformity, but carried to its logical conclusion,
there was no stopping point.53 American courts and scholars have not
favored renvoi in the tort area.54
The application of lex loci in so many contexts led to irrational and
unjust decisions. Beneath the guise of escape devices, courts sporadically
departed from the doctrine in order to do justice.55 Resort to escape de-
vices undermined the strongest arguments in favor of lex loci: certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result. In combination, lex loci and the
escape devices enabled forum preference.56 The reasons articulated by the
courts to justify departure from the traditional rule were often so patently
irrational and arbitrary as to invite widespread criticism of an admittedly
proper result, and thus "make the choice between the disease and the
cure a difficult one." 57
D. Departure from the Traditional Approach
Choice of law issues involving automobile guest statutes constituted
one area which exposed the deficiencies of the traditional rule.58 Neihardt
v. Knipmeyer59 is a good example of a Missouri court's application of tradi-
tional principles to the choice of law issue prior to Kennedy. Plaintiff sued
for injuries resulting from the defendant's negligent operation of the motor
vehicle in which plaintiff was a guest. The trip had been planned in
Missouri, but the accident occurred in South Dakota, a state with a guest
statute. Missouri had no such statute. In spite of the fact that both parties
were Missouri residents, the court held that South Dakota's guest statute
controlled the disposition of the case. The court stated:
We have been cited to no Missouri decision indicating that tort
actions tried in Missouri are not governed by the law of the state
where the tort occurred.60
51. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH.
L. REv. 637, 672-75 (1960).
52. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 53-58 (1971).
See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 142, 95 N.W.2d 814, 820, (1959) (concurring opinion).
53. Haumschild v. Continental Gas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
54. See Griswold, Renvoi Revisted, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1167, 1170-76
(1938).
55. Weintraub, A Method of Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL
L. REv. 215, 216 (1963).
56. See R. LEFLAR, AmEaicAN CONFLICTS LAW § 95 (1968).
57. Weintraub, supra note 55, at 216.
58. See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory
of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Law," 69 YALE L.J. 595,
599-600 (1960).
59. 420 S.W.2d 27 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
60. Id. at 29.
1972]
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Four years previously, New York had abandoned the vested rights
doctrine in the famous case of Babcock v. Jackson.61 The Neihardt opinion
did not cite Babcock or mention any new approaches to tort choice of law.
The Babcock court declined to follow lex loci but went on to adopt what
the opinion called the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contracts" doc-
trine. The court stated that
justice, fairness and "the best practical result" . . . may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence
or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised
in the litigation.62
In spite of the Babcock decision, other courts also rejected a change in
the traditional approach to tort choice of law.63 Some emphasized the
confusion generated by the modern approach, while others emphasized
the absence of a suitable alternative to lex loci. Other jurisdictions have
not yet reconsidered their prior decisions.
IH. THE MoDERN APPRoAcH
A. Interest Analysis
Before examining the most significant relationship test adopted by
Missouri in Kennedy v. Dixon,64 it is important to understand a related
choice of law theory.
The strongest proponent of governmental interest analysis, Brainard
Currie, distinguished between "true conflicts" and "false conflicts." A true
conflict resulted when the law of one state could not be applied without
subverting the policy of the law of another state. A false conflict occurred
when only one state had a legitimate interest in applying its law to a certain
issue. Currie's methodology consisted of interest analysis with a forum
preference corollary. First, the court examined the policies behind the
conflicting laws to determine which state had a legitimate interest in
having its law applied. If a false conflict resulted, the law of the single
interested state should be applied. A superficial true conflict might
be reduced to a false conflict by interpretation. If a true conflict was un-
avoidable, the law of the forum should control. Currie believed that weigh-
61. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
62. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Several schools of
thought have claimed the Babcock decision. See generally Cavers, Cheatham,
Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, &c Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212 (1963).
63. In the following cases the court refused to abandon the traditional ap-
proach: McGinty v. Ballantine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891
(1966); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Folk v. York-
Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236 (Del. 1968); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201
So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); McDaniel v. Sin, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965);
Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968); Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194,
143 S.E.2d 103 (1965); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964);
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
64. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
[Vol. 37
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ing legitimate multi-state interests should be a political and not a judicial
function.65 Currie's methodology tended to favor lex fori.
By its very nature governmental interest analysis cannot include all
policy considerations that should be included in a choice of law theory.66
It fails to consider the traditional demands for certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, encourages blatant forum shopping, and disregards
the parties' reasonable expectations. By failing to give due deference to for-
eign law, it threatens interstate judicial order.6 '
Currie argued that his version of interest analysis eliminated the weigh-
ing of the significance of the contacts that several states might have with
an issue.68 Yet, the forum still must determine the legitimacy of a state's
interests; thus, to this extent, the court would seem to be involved in a
weighing process. Therefore, in a practical sense the judicial task is not
simplified and the court becomes involved in the political process Currie
sought to avoid.69
Interest analysis fails to aid a court in the satisfactory resolution of
true conflicts. Choice of law rules should appropriately dispose of difficult
as well as easy cases. The forum preference corollary seems just as arbitrary
as the traditional approach, and likewise fails to select the appropriate
law. Although interest analysis is probably a better choice of law formula
than lex loci deliciti, the courts have seldom used the Currie version as
an unassisted basis of decision.70 The Babcock opinion mentions interests,
but the case was not resolved on this basis.7 1 Although interest analysis
can represent a distinct methodology in itself, it is probably most valuable
as an implicit component of the most significant relationship test.
B. The Most Significant Relationship Test72
In Kennedy v. Dixon73 Missouri abandoned lex loci delicti and adopted
the most significant relationship test. Missouri residents Kennedy and
Towey, while in Saint Louis, planned a vacation trip that was to originate
and terminate in Missouri. The parties traveled to New York in the Towey
65. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-flict of Laws, 63 CoLtrm. L. REv. 1233, 1242-43 (1963); Currie, Notes on Methods
and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178. See also Currie,
The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. Cm. L.
REv. 258 (1961).
66. See Leflar, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 637, 639,
641 (1968).
67. R. LEF LaR, AMERiCAN CONFLiCrs LAW § 97 (1968).
68. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DuE L.J. 171, 176, 178.
69. See Note, supra note 31, at 471-72.
70. R. LEFLAR, supra note 67, § 135. But see Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,
432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1967).
71. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145. Of the available alternatives, one writer
concluded that the most significant relationship test constituted the most logical
approach for Missouri. Northrip, Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases-A Coming
Conflict in Missouri, 33 Mo. L. REv. 81, 92 (1958).
73. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
1972-]
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
automobile, which was licensed and garaged in Missouri. On the return
trip a head-on collision occurred, killing the driver, Mary Towey, and
injuring plaintiff, a guest in the Towey automobile. Although the acci-
dent occurred in Indiana, Kennedy brought suit in Missouri against the
estate of Mary Towey for decedent's negligence. Indiana had a guest
statute, but Missouri did not. Plaintiff submitted her case on alternative
theories, one of which argued that Missouri law should control the guest-
host relationship. The court agreed, holding that while Indiana law con-
trolled the central negligence issue, Missouri law governed the guest-host
question.
Under the traditional Missouri approach, Indiana law would have
been applied on the guest-host issue, thus foreclosing plaintiff from re-
covery.7 4 The court specifically rejected lex lod delicti and adopted the
most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second):
§ 145 The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles
of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury oc-
curred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.7 5
74. In the following suits brought by an automobile guest against his host,
the Missouri courts applied the guest statute of the place of wrong to determine
the substantive rights of the parties: Allen v. Keck, 212 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1954);
Goodman v. McCulley, 367 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1963); Bartlett v. Green, 352 S.W.2d
17 (Mo. 1961); Hisle v. Balkom, 328 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1959); Wilcox v. Swenson,
324 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1959); Barnes v. Lackey, 319 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1959); Ausmus
v. Swearingen, 296 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1956); Lines v. Teachenor, 273 S.W.2d 300 (Mo.
1954); Tillman v. Zumwalt, 363 Mo. 820, 250 S.W.2d 142 (1952); Wendel v.
Shaw, 361 Mo. 416, 235 S.W.2d 266 (1950); Wise v. Coleman, 360 Mo. 829, 230
S.W.2d 870 (1950); Boehrer v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 465, 222 S.W.2d 97 (1949);
Dennis v. Wood, 357 Mo. 886, 211 S.W.2d 470 (1948); Taylor v. Laderman, 349
Mo. 415, 161 S.W.2d 253 (1942); Neihardt v. Knipmeyer, 420 S.W.2d 27 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1967); Fullington v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d
246 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Woolf v. Holton, 240 Mo. App. 1123, 224 S.W.2d
861 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949); Yarnall v. Gass, 240 Mo. App. 451, 217 S.W.2d 283
(K.C. Ct. App. 1948); Stevers v. Walker, 233 Mo. App. 636, 125 S.W.2d 920
K.C. Ct. App. 1939); Hargis v. Denny, 117 S.W.2d 368 (K.C. Mo. App. 1938);
McCarty v. Bishop, 231 Mo. App. 604, 102 S.W.2d 126 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937);
Hall v. Wilkerson, 84 S.W.2d 1063 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145. In the Kennedy opinion the court cited Bab-cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), andNorthrip, supra note 72.
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An often overlooked part of the test lies in the reference in section 145 to
section six which provides:
§ 6 Choice of Law Principles
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law
to be applied.7 6
In applying these provisions to the facts before it, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that Missouri had the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties with regard to the guest-host relationship.77
A number of points should be made about the Restatement (Second)
test. The most significant relationship test as applied in Missouri is a
qualitative and not a quantitative test.78 The greatest danger in the ap-
proach is that "the Restatement (Second) will be interpreted to direct
the counting of physical contacts with the parties and with the transaction
and the awarding of the palm to the state with the 'most' contacts."
79
The test could be regarded as a two-tier theory. First, several important
factual contacts are enumerated. This listing is not intended to be all
inclusive, but does serve as a convenient starting point, and guides the
court as to what contacts should be considered. The state of the most
significant relationship with respect to a certain issue probably has one
or more of these contacts with the occurrence and the partiess 0 After
the court has grouped certain contacts with the appropriate states, it
utilizes the choice of law policies set out in section six to give these con-
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6(2). These policy factors are very similar to
the "choice-influencing considerations" of Robert A. Leflar:
A. Predictability of results;
B. Maintenance of interstate ... order;
C. Simplification of the judicial task;
D. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
E. Application of the better rule of law.
Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 267,
282 (1966); see Leflar, Conflicts Laws; More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
54 CAmF. L. REv. 1584, 1586-88 (1966).
77. Kennedy v. Dixon, 489 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
78. Id.
79. Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IowA L. REv. 399, 413 (1968).
80. R=ATENENT (SECOND) § 145, comment c.
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tacts qualitative significance. 8 The state possessing the contacts with the
most qualitative significance will be the state of the most significant rela-
tionship on a given issue. The weighing of the contacts could be viewed
as a weighing of the policies discoverable from these contacts.8 2 Thus,
the Restatement (Second) methodology constitutes a subjective analysis of
objective factors.8 3
In determining the qualitative significance of these factual contacts,
the forum gives consideration to the relevant policies of all potentially
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the applica-
tion of their law to a given issue.84 To this extent, the Restatement (Second)
has absorbed a degree of interest analysis. This incorporation helps insure
emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the test.8 5 However, this is not the
interest analysis envisioned by Currie; there is no forum preference. A more
comprehensive test, the Restatement (Second) has taken certain positive
aspects of interest analysis, and combined them with other policy con-
siderations within a definite framework.8 6
In Kennedy both of the interested states had two contacts with the
occurrence and the parties. Indiana was the place of injury and injury-
producing conduct. Missouri was the parties' common residence and the
center of their relationship. The Missouri court went beyond this quantita-
tive inquiry to qualitatively adduce the significance of each contact. The
court pointed out that Indiana had no interest in applying its guest statute
to two Missouri residents. In contrast, Missouri had a greater interest than
any other state in the relationship between its citizens. The Missouri legis-
lature's refusal to enact a guest statute indicated the state's public policy:
Missouri guests should be compensated for injuries negligently inflicted
by Missouri hosts. The court concluded that the host should compensate
the guest no matter where the wrong occurred.Sr
The opinion emphasized the policy aspects of the most significant
relationship test. This reinforces the argument that in Missouri the con-
siderations outlined in section six are an important part of the test.8 8
The state with the most quantitative contacts will also usually be that
of the most significant relationship.8 9 However, since the Restatement
(Second) puts forth a qualitative test, a mere numerical superiority of
contacts will not always insure that the favored state will be that of the most
significant relationship. A court could validly conclude that one important
81. Note, Conflict of Laws: The Adoption of the Most Significant Relationship
Test in Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 457, 468 (1970); see RSrATEIr NT (SECOND)
§ 145, comments b, e.
82. R. LEFLAR, supra note 67, § 96.
83. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603, 622 (1970).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6, § 145, comment e.
85. PL LrxLAR, supra note 67, § 135.
86. Id. § 96.
87. 439 S.W.2d at 184-85; see Douglas, Conflict of Laws-Missouri Takes a
New Approach to an Old Problem, 35 Mo. L. REv. 91, 94 (1970).
88. "The contacts serve ... as a [convenient] starting point upon which the
catalyst of governmental policy, as viewed through the aims of the state's statutory
scheme, acts to achieve a just and equitable result." Note, supra note 81, at 476.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145, comments e-f.
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contact is more significant than a combination of lesser ones.90 A hypo-
thetical case will serve to illustrate. Plaintiff and defendant are Missouri
residents who attend the University of Indiana for nine months of the
year. Plaintiff is injured in Indiana while a guest in defendant's car, as
a consequence of the latter's negligent driving. Defendant's car is licensed
and garaged in Missouri. Indiana has a typical guest statute. Plaintiff sues
defendant in a Missouri court.91 Query: Which state has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties on the guest-host issue?
Indiana has three contacts: the place of injury, the place of injury-producing
conduct, and the place where the relationship of the parties is centered.
Missouri has only one contact: the place of the parties' common residence.
However, Indiana has no important policy interests that would be furthered
by applying its guest statute to two Missouri residents, while the decided
public policy of Missouri would be furthered if forum law is applied.
The licensing, garaging and registration of the automobile in Missouri
should also be considered. 92 Remembering that "Missouri has a greater
concern than any other state in the relationships between its citizens .... -93
Missouri's single contact could well qualitatively outweigh Indiana's three
lesser contacts.
The Missouri court also abandoned the traditional rule's package
approach. 94 The new analysis focuses on each issue, and then a determina-
tion is made as to which law should be applied to this particular issue. The
Restatement (Second) recognizes that tort choice of law issues are divisible;
thus a court need not apply the law of only one state to the collective issues
in a case: 95
[T]here is no good reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim
must be resolved by reference to the law of the same jurisdiction.96
The court must weigh the significance of each contact in light of each
issue. 97 Separate rules are stated in the Restatement (Second) for certain
recurring issues in tort cases. 98 Certain contacts will be more or less im-
portant with respect to certain issues. Thus, the identity of the state with
the most significant relationship will depend on the nature of the particular
issue.99
In Kennedy the court split the issues in accordance with the dominant
policy interests of the states concerned with the disposition of those issues:
The question of negligence ... should be determined by the law
90. R. LEELAR, supra note 67, § 135.
91. This hypothetical is contained in Note, supra note 81, at 473. The facts
of this hypothetical are close to those of Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d
792 (1965). See text accompanying note 121 infra.
92. Note, supra note 81, at 473-74.
93. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 185 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
94. See id. at 184-85.
95. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) § 145, comment d.
96. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 752 (1963).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145, comment d.
98. Id. §§ 156-80.
99. Id. § 145, comment d.
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of the state where the tort occurs because that is the state with the
dominant interest concerning that issue, but such right of recovery
should not be limited or barred, depending on whether that state
does or does not have a guest statute.100
No Indiana policy would be advanced by applying its law to the guest-host
issue, but Indiana did have a strong policy interest in requiring Missouri
residents to comply with the standard of care for the operation of motor
vehicles on Indiana highways.
The Missouri court noted that at times factual situations might arise
where a court will be unable to determine the state with the most sig-
nificant relationship to a particular issue. In such situations it instructed
the trial courts to apply the substantive law of the place of wrong.10' Some
writers have argued that this language suggests that the Missouri adoption
of the Restatement (Second) test was less than complete. Such an interpre-
tation rests on the premise that to some extent the Kennedy opinion en-
dorsed the Currie version of interest analysis. Since Kennedy was a false
conflict, one of these writers contends that the holding directs trial courts
to use the most significant relationship test for false conflicts, but to fall
back on lex loci delicti for true conflicts.' 02 Such a reading of the case is
unwarranted. The opinion does not mention interest analysis. Further,
the court stated that in establishing this procedure it did "not intend that
it should provide a means of abdicating the obligation of determining the
state which has the most significant relationship."' 0 3 In most, if not all cases,
"it should be possible for the trial court to determine the state with the
most significant contacts and relationship to the issues involved .... ,04
This language, leaving open the possibility of resort to the traditional
approach, was probably included to aid the trial courts in the difficult
transition period. The most significant relationship test should be employed
in the true conflict situation. Although the competing state policies will
have to be weighed, balancing tests have become rather prominent in the
law. Further, a choice of law theory should be applicable to both easy and
difficult cases.
Nevertheless, this language does serve as a possible limitation on the
opinion. It might be viewed as an escape device to avoid employment of the
Restatement (Second) methodology. However, given the inherent flexibility
of the most significant relationship test, resort to escape devices should be
unnecessary. In Kennedy the plaintiff pleaded his case in alternative counts:
one under Indiana law; the other under Missouri law.105 This is a wise
practice. Further, given the present uncertainty of Missouri choice of law,
it would be wise to plead in the alternative on the choice of law issue:
one count under the most significant relationship test; the other under
lex loci delicti or the appropriate escape devices.
100. 439 S.W.2d at 185.
101. Id.
102. Note, Conflict of Laws-Choice of Law Problems in Tort Cases-Automo-
bile Guest Statutes, 13 ST. L. L.J. 467, 474, 479 (1969); see R. WEINTRAUB, CoM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 234-35 (1971).
103. 439 S.W.2d at 185.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 175-76.
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The court's vote, one abstaining, one concurring, two dissenting and
a three man majority, could point to another limitation. Three justices
voted to abandon lex loci deliciti, while three justices voted to retain the
doctrine. 10 6 However, the court will probably extend rather than retreat
from the decision. The case has been further applied,10 7 and has received
the support of most of the writers.' 08
Kennedy v. Dixon o0 should not be regarded as a result-oriented opin-
ion. Under the traditional system of lex loci delicti and the escape devices
the court could have allowed the plaintiff to recover without adopting a
new choice of law methodology. For example, the concurring opinion
questioned the wisdom of abandoning the traditional rule, but would have
reached the same result as the majority by holding the Indiana guest statute
unenforceable in Missouri as against public policy."10
The dissent criticized the most significant relationship test as lacking
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result."' Proponents of the
new approach acknowledge this, but argue that justice in the individual
case should be paramount"'12 The majority in Kennedy contended that
additional cases will establish further guidance."13 However, even though
the legal principles are the same, it will be seldom, if ever, that the facts
of any two cases will be sufficiently alike for one to be dispositive of the
other.114 Forum shopping would seem to be a very real danger." 5 Although
the reasonable expectations of the parties might not be protected, this
consideration is not as important in the tort as in the contract area."16
The new doctrine's inherent flexibility produces this lack of certainty.
This flexibility constitutes the method's greatest advantage, and at the same
time, its greatest disadvantage. Since determining the significance of a
contact is a subjective process, reasonable courts may differ as to the
significance of a contact in a given situation." 7 Further, the courts still
have an opportunity to be result-oriented. Yet, judicial discretion is exer-
cised in many areas of the law, and, after examining the history of lex
loci and its resulting escape devices, the need for flexibility in a choice
106. See Kennedy v. Dixon, 489 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
107. See Roy v. Landers, 467 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1971).
108. See, e.g., Douglas, Conflict of Laws-Missouri Takes a New Approach
to an Old Problem, 85 Mo. L. REv. 91 (1970); Note, Conflict of Laws: The Adop-
tion of the Most Significant Relationship Test in Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C. L. REv.
457 (1970); Note, Conflict of Laws-Choice of Law Problems in Tort Cases-Auto-
mobile Guest Statutes, 18 ST. L. L.J. 467 (1969). See also Northrip, Choice of Law
Rules in Tort Cases-A Coming Conflict in Missouri, 3 Mo. L. Rav. 81 (1968).
109. 489 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
110. Id. at 186 (concurring opinion).
111. Id. at 186-87 (dissenting opinion).
112. See, e.g., Moreland, Conflicts of Law-Choice of Law in Torts-A Critique,
56 Ky. L.J. 5, 24 (1967).
113. 489 S.W.2d at 185.
114. See Cavers, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 68 COLUM. L. Rv. 1219, 1221 (1968).
115. See LaBrum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty,
and Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747, 748, 750-51 (1968).
116. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 145, comment b.
117. R. LFXL.A, supra note 67, § 135.
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of law system becomes readily apparent.118 The most significant relation-
ship test contains the requisite flexibility to accommodate competing
policies in a multi-state tort situation.
Critics of the Restatement (Second) point to the New York experience
with the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" test.1 19 In Babcock
v. Jackson120 two New York domiciliaries were on a trip in Ontario when
the plaintiff-guest received injuries as a result of defendant-host's negligence.
The trip began and was to end in New York, where the car was licensed
and garaged. Ontario had a guest statute, but New York did not. The court
held that New York law should control the guest-host relationship. In a
more difficult case, Dym v. Gordon,'21 two New York domiciliaries were
independently attending a six week summer session at the University of
Colorado. While a guest in defendant's automobile, registered in New York,
plaintiff was injured by defendant's negligent driving. The court held that
the guest statute of the place of injury, Colorado, should be applied.
Justice Fuld, who wrote the majority opinion in Babcock, dissented in Dym.
But in Tooker v. Lopez' 22 the New York Court of Appeals held that the
Michigan guest statute should not be applied to bar a wrongful death action
between two New York residents. Decedent-guest was killed in Michigan
while riding in defendant-host's automobile, which was registered in New
York. The accident occurred while decedent and defendant were both
attending the University of Michigan. These cases illustrate that in difficult
cases, courts and judges may disagree as to where the most significant rela-
tionship lies. Manipulative possibilities result from the new approach's
flexibility.
Ehrenzweig has criticized the new formula as circular. Since the signif-
icance of the relationship is the very question which the choice of law rule
must answer, what should be a conclusion has become a premise for the
choice. 123 This noted scholar feared that the most significant relationship
test is a purely black letter approach that will be beset by many of the
same difficulties that discredited the original Restatement, and will in-
evitably add to the confusion in tort choice of law.' 24 For example, at times
the Restatement (Second) may take a jurisdiction-selecting approach similar
to the traditional system.125
The Kennedy majority acknowledged that the new rule will make
the judicial task more difficult.' 26 Especially in a true conflict situation,
118. Douglas, Conflict of Laws-Missouri Takes a New Approach to an Old
Problem, 35 Mo. L. REv. 91, 95 (1970).
119. See, e.g., Currie, Conflicts, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Durx
L.J. 1.
120. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
121. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
122. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969); accord, Macey v. Rozbicki, 18
N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380 (1966).
123. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIar oF LAWS § 351 (1962).
124. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1230, 1232 (1965).
125. See Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law
of Torts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700, 704 (1963).
126. 439 S.W.2d at 185.
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the forum court must undertake a difficult balancing process. Yet, courts
have often successfully undertaken difficult processes in order to meet
the needs of justice.
While the Restatement (Second) test does not outwardly consider which
law may be better, it replaces the mechanics of lex loci with an analytical
approach to choice of law. Importance attaches to the policies of the forum
and interested foreign states. In some situations the interests of the forum
will be advanced, but in others these interests will be subordinated. Al-
though the new doctrine fails to defer to other interested states in all
situations, maintenance of interstate judicial order should not be jeopard-
ized.12 7 The Restatement (Second) test provides an appropriate balance
between furthering the forum's interests and maintaining interstate judical
order.
IV. PROJECTION' 2"
To illustrate the potential impact of Kennedy v. Dixon'29 on Missouri
law certain selected issues in tort will now be considered.
A. The Standard of Care'80
In setting the standard of care in a multi-state tort situation, Missouri
has followed a straightforward lex loci delicti approach.' 3 ' In Hall Motor
Freight v. Montgomery'32 the plaintiff sued in Missouri for property damage
resulting from an automobile accident in Kansas. A Missouri statute re-
quired the operator of a motor vehicle to exercise the highest degree of
care. Kansas had no such statute. The trial court instructed the jury under
the common law of Kansas, which required only ordinary care on the part
of the defendants. On appeal the court approved this instruction, holding
that when an action is brought in Missouri for a tort committed in another
state, matters relating to the right of action should be governed by the
lex loci delicti. In this case the state of conduct and the state of injury
were the same. Thus, the conflict presented was between the law of the
state of conduct-injury and the law of the forum.
In Hughes Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co.,' 3 3 on the other
hand, the injury-producing conduct and the injury occurred in different
states. Defendant sold certain dressed rabbits to the plaintiff in Missouri.
These rabbits were shipped to Ohio where the plaintiff sold them to a
third party who contracted tularemia. The victim successfully sued the
127. Northrip, supra note 108, at 85-86.
128. Herein of the standard of care, tort defenses, immunity from suit, survival
of tort claims, and wrongful death.
129. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 157.
131. See Bollinger v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 334 Mo. 720, 67 S.W.2d 985 (En Banc
1934); Caylor v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 332 Mo. 851, 59 S.W.2d 661 (1933); Larsen v.Webb, 332 Mo. 370, 58 S.W.2d 967 (1933); Tietsort v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 332 Mo.640, 15 S.W.2d 779 (1929); Hiatt v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 308 Mo. 77, 271 S.W. 806(1925); Sisk v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 67 S.W.2d 830 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934);
Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S.W.2d 172 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934).
132. 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748 (1948).
133. 242 S.W.2d 285 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951).
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plaintiff in Ohio. Plaintiff then sued defendant in Missouri. An Ohio statute
made the selling of diseased provisions criminal, and the Ohio courts had
held the violation of this statute to be negligence per se. The Missouri
court held that the Ohio standard of care, as defined in the criminal statute,
should control disposition of the case.
Under the methodology of the Restatement (Second), the forum will
apply a general standard of care prescribed by the applicable law in deter-
mining whether the actor was negligent. General standards are usually
found in the common law.' 34 The forum will also apply a precise standard
specified by the controlling law. Precise standards may be established by
criminal statute, or may be found in the common law. If the actor's conduct
involved the violation of a criminal statute, the controlling law should
determine whether a precise standard of care can be derived from the
statute, and whether the necessary conditions of the statute have been
satisfied. The controlling law will also determine whether violation of
the statute constitutes negligence per se, some evidence of negligence, or
no evidence of negligence. 135
If the most significant relationship test is applied to the standard of
care issue, the choice of law will probably be the same, although the
rationale will be different. The applicable law will usually be the local
law of the state where the injury occurred. 13 6 The place of injury will be
the contact with the most qualitative significance on the standard of care
issue. The state where the injury occurs usually will have the greatest in-
terest in assuring that persons within its jurisdiction comply with the
standard of care established for the particular activity by this state.
Since the state of injury and the place of injury-producing conduct are
often the same, the place of conduct would seem to be the second most im-
portant contact on the standard of care issue. Thus, if the state of wrongful
conduct and injury are the same, this state's local law will usually deter-
mine the standard of care. Problems may arise when the conduct and injury
occur in different states and the application of a precise standard of care
is in question.137 However, Missouri will probably look to the law of the
state of injury.
B. Tort Defenses' 38
Contributory negligence' 39 is a frequently encountered defense in a
negligence action.14o When a choice of law issue arose concerning this de-
fense, the Missouri courts traditionally applied the prevailing rule in the
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 157, comment b.
135. Id. § 157, comment c.
136. Id. § 157 (2).
137. Id. § 157, comment d.
138. Id. § 161 (the general principle). See §§ 162-70 (specific applications of
the general principle).
139. Id. §164.
140. See generally 2 R. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAw or TORTS § 22 (1956);
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971).
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state where the injury occurred. 141 In Bryan v. Sweeney' 42 the existence of
contributory negligence was determined in this manner. While doing elec-
trical work on defendant's Illinois farm, plaintiff, a Missouri resident,
suffered injuries from electric shock. When plaintiff sued in Missouri,
defendant pleaded that under the law of Illinois plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. In barring plaintiff's recovery, the court held that Illinois law
controlled the contributory negligence issue.
The Missouri courts have also applied the local law of the state of
injury to determine what degree of contributory fault is necessary to pre-
dude recovery by the plaintiff in whole or in part. In Donahoo v. Illinois
Terminal R.R.148 plaintiff sued for personal injuries suffered when de-
fendant's negligently operated freight train struck the motor vehicle in
which plaintiff was riding. Although the accident occurred at an Illinois
crossing, plaintiff sued in Missouri. Under Illinois law contributory negli-
gence served as a complete defense (unless defendant's actions could be
characterized as wilful and wanton). The court applied Illinois law to
determine the degree of contributory fault necessary to preclude plaintiff's
recovery.
Contributory negligence by the plaintiff is an absolute bar to recovery
in Missouri 14 4 and in most jurisdictions.145 In other states this defense
has been replaced by a statutory scheme of comparative negligence.' 4
Missouri courts have applied foreign comparative negligence statutes when
such was the law of the place of wrong.' 47 In Tepel v. Thompson148
defendant's locomotive struck plaintiff's automobile at a grade crossing
in Arkansas. Plaintiff sued for personal injuries in Missouri, alleging
that the railroad was negligent. Applying the Arkansas comparative negli-
gence statute, the court held for defendant because the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence exceeded or equalled the negligence of the defendant.
To determine the elements of last clear chance or the humanitarian
doctrine applicable in a multi-state tort, the Missouri courts have again
looked to the law of the locus delicti.' 49 Plaintiff sued defendant railroad
for personal injuries and property damage in Marshall v. Saint Louis-S.F.
141. See Bollinger v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 334 Mo. 720, 67 S.W.2d 985 (En Banc
1934); Scott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 333 Mo. 374, 62 S.W.2d 834 (1933); Caylor v.
St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 332 Mo. 851, 59 S.W.2d 661 (1933); Oxford v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.,
331 Mo. 53, 52 S.W.2d 983 (1932). In Missouri the burden of proving contributory
negligence is regarded as a substantive issue. O'Leary v. Illinois Terminal R.R.,
299 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. En Banc 1957).
142. 363 Mo. 1024, 256 S.W.2d 769 (1953).
143. 275 S.W.2d 244 (Mo. 1955).
144. Shephard v. Harris, 329 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
145. 2 R. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAw oF TORTS § 22 (1956); W. PRossER,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971).
146. 2 R. HARPER & F. JAmFS, THE LAw oF TORTS § 22 (1956); W. PRossFR,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 (4th ed. 1971).
147. See, e.g., Ramey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 823 Mo. 662, 21 S.W.2d 873 (1929),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 614 (1930); Hiatt v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 308 Mo. 77, 271
S.W. 806 (1925).
148. 359 Mo. 1, 220 S.W.2d 23 (1949).
149. See, e.g., Vail v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 1009, 232 S.W.2d 491 (1950).
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Ry.1 o0 The suit was brought in Missouri, although the collision producing
the injuries occurred in Kansas. As a defense to his own negligence, the
defendant pleaded plaintiff's contributory negligence. Seeking to avoid
this defense, the plaintiff invoked the doctrine of last dear chance. In
determining the elements of last clear chance applicable to the case, the
court consulted the law of Kansas.
Under the Restatement (Second) the law selected by application of the
most significant relationship test determines the constituent elements, and
hence, the existence of contributory fault. The selected law also governs
the degree of contributory fault necessary to deny or reduce plaintiff's re-
covery, and determines whether plaintiff can recover, in spite of his neg-
ligence, when the defendant's conduct is of an aggravated nature.151
A choice of law issue may also arise with respect to the effect of
plaintiff's contributory fault. Plaintiff may be totally precluded from
recovery, 152 or, by virtue of a comparative negligence doctrine, be able
to recover only reduced damages.' 5 ' Plaintiff's recovery may neither be
barred nor reduced, because of the doctrine of last dear chance, 5 4 or in
Missouri, the humanitarian doctrine. 5' The law selected by application
of Restatement (Second) section 145 will be applied to determine which
of these results will occur.1 56
The place of injury will be the contact with the most qualitative sig-
nificance with regard to a defense issue. The state where the injury occurs
usually will have the greatest interest in determining which actors may
avoid liability for their wrongful acts. In a majority of cases, the plaintiff's
conduct allegedly constituting contributory fault will have occurred in
the state of injury. If so, the local law of this state controls whether the
plaintiff's conduct amounted to contributory fault, and the extent to which
any contributory fault precludes recovery. Where the place of injury-
producing conduct and the place of injury are not the same, the local
law of the state of injury should usually be applied. 15 7 Thus, in the defense
area, it would seem that under the new rationale the choice of law will
also be the same.'6 8
C. Immunity From Suit' 59
Traditionally, the existence of an immunity was similarly determined
by the law of the place of injury, although it was recognized that any state
with a substantial connection to the facts had the judicial power to apply
its own law.' 60 The interspousal immunity between husband and wife is
150. 361 Mo. 234, 234 S.W.2d 524 (En Banc 1950).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 164, comment a.
152. Id. § 164.
153. Id. § 164, comment d.
154. Id. § 164, comment e.
155. See generally Mo. Approved Instr. §§ 17.14-.15 (2d ed. 1969).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 164(1).
157. Id. § 164, comment b.
158. See Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968) (citing and adopting
REsrATMENT (SEcoND) § 164).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 145, comment d, § 156, comment f, § 161, com-
ments d-e, §§ 168-69.
160. R. LEFLAR, AMEIucAN CONFLIcTS LAw § 141 (1968).
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one of the most common examples. 161 On this question the Missouri courts
followed the traditional approach. In Robinson v. Gaines'62 the court
forsook the law of the parties' domicile to apply the local law of the place
of wrong. The wife sued the estate of her deceased husband for her in-
juries caused by the decedent's negligent operation of an automobile.
Suit was brought in Missouri, the residence of the husband and wife,
although the accident occurred in New Mexico. Under Missouri law a
widow could maintain suit against the administrator of her deceased hus-
band's estate. But the forum applied lex loci delicti, holding that under
New Mexico-law the widow had no cause of action.
By their very nature, immunity questions raise separate issues in a
tort case. The willingness of the Missouri court to solve separate issues
by different states' laws has cleared the way for a different choice of law
on the immunity issue. x63 Under the most significant relationship test,
the choice of law will not only be decided under a new rationale, but a
different result may be rendered. 16 4
The new approach is applied to determine whether one family mem-
ber is immune from tort liability to another family member.165 The
selected law determines what family relationships give rise to the im-
munity, and the circumstances under which the immunity is in effect.
This law will control whether the estate of a deceased spouse is immune
from suit by a surviving spouse, and whether the relationship must have
existed at the time of tort. 66
Under the new Missouri approach the applicable law will usually be
the local law of the state of the parties' domicile.' 6 7 Several reasons are
advanced to explain the immunity from tort liability between spouses: the
common law doctrine of spousal identity, the desire to preserve marital
harmony and the desire to protect insurance companies from collusive
suits.168 Under any of these rationales the state of the parties' common
domicile will usually be the state with the most significant relationship to
this issue. However, if the parties' relationship to the state of their domicile
is considerably less close than their relationship to some other state, the
law of the other state should be applied. 169
161. See 1 R. HARPER & F. JmES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 8 (1956); W. PROSSER,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
162. 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960).
163. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 160, § 141.
164. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1968) (citing and applying
the rule of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 169).
165. RE.STATEMENT (SECOND) § 169 (1).
166. Id. § 169, comment a. Note that the application of the most significant
relationship test would have yielded a different result in the Robinson case.
167. See id. § 169 (2).
168. See generally Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the
Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv.
397 (1954); Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution and Counterrevolution in
American Tort Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 307 (1967); Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 973
(1964).
169. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) § 169, comment b. While most writers agree that
the abolition of lex loci delicti as to interspousal immunity was justified, some
have attacked a lex domicilii approach on this issue as overly broad and not apt
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D. Survival of Tort Claims17 0
At common law tort claims did not survive the death of the tortfeasor
or the injured person.' 7 ' This has been changed by statute in all jurisdic-
tions. Yet, in many states certain torts do not survive.' 7 2 Under a vested
rights rationale, it would seem that a state which created a cause of action
could also destroy it. Thus, if by the law of the place of wrong there was
no survival, the death of the tortfeasor or injured person would terminate
the claim everywhere. If the claim did survive under the controlling law,
the death of the tortfeasor or injured person should nowhere be a ground
to refuse to entertain suit.173
In Burg v. Knox' 7 4 plaintiff, a resident of Kansas, was injured while
an automobile guest of James Knox, a resident of Missouri. Knox later
died from injuries suffered in the accident, which occurred in Kansas.
Plaintiff sued defendant-administratrix in Missouri. Under the Kansas
statute the plaintiff could not maintain his action. The Missouri court
followed the rule of the original Restatement:
Whether a claim for damages for tort survives the death of the
tortfeasor or of the injured person is determined by the law of the
place of wrong.' 75
The court cited Newlin v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry.:176
No case under the lex loci, then no case under the lex fori; and the
supplement, viz., a case under the lex loci, then one under the lexfori .... 177
The Restatement (Second) determines whether a tort claim survives
by applying section 145 to select the applicable law.'7 8 It also provides that
if the claim survives the death of the tortfeasor or injured party, there
may be recovery by or against the decedent's representative, 70 provided
the lex fori permits the particular representative to sue and be sued. 8 0
If the forum prohibits suit by or against this particufar representative, no
recovery is allowed.' 8 '
for all law-fact patterns. While many of these writers do not subscribe to the most
significant relationship test, they would probably agree that there are situations
in which the common domicile of the parties should not be regarded as the con-
tact with the most qualitative significance with respect to the interspousal im-
munity issue. See, e.g., Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution and Counter-
revolution in American Tort Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 307, 330-32 (1967).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 167.
171. 2 R. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW Or TORTS § 24 (1956); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW or TORTS § 126 (4th ed. 1971).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 167, comment a.
173. R. LErLAR, supra note 160, § 139.
174. 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W.2d 96 (1933).
175. RESTATEMENT § 390.
176. 222 Mo. 375, 121 S.W. 125 (1909).
177. Id. at 391-92, 121 S.W. at 130.
178. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) § 167.
179. Id. § 167, comment b.
180. See id. §§ 351, 354-55, 358.
181. Id. § 167, comment b.
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While most cases have held that the survival issue is controlled by
the law of the state of conduct and injury, it is questionable whether such
decisions will be followed in the future, in view of the Missouri court's
pronouncement that the issues in a tort case are divisible for choice of law
purposes. The state of conduct and injury will not by reason of these con-
tacts alone have the most significant relationship to the survival issue.
However, the local law of this state will be applied unless some other state
possesses a greater interest in the determination of the issue. If the parties
are domiciled in a single state, this state will usually be that of the most
significant relationship. 182
Revival of a tort claim presents a different situation with respect to
choice of law. Here the action is brought during the lifetime of both the
tortfeasor and the injured party, but one of the parties dies before rendition
of the judgment.183 In Ausmus v. Swearingen'8 4 the Missouri court applied
forum law to determine whether the suit could be revived, regardless of
whether the claim survived under the law of the place of wrong. The court
justified the rule on the ground that once the court acquired jurisdiction,
such jurisdiction should only be removed by the local law of the forum
state. This seems to have been the majority position. The Restatement
(Second) suggests that a rule of the forum making revival of the suit con-
tingent upon the survival of the cause of action could be interpreted by
the forum to require as a condition for revival that the claim survive under
the law with the most significant relationship on the question of survival.' 85 ,
E. Wrongful Death'8 6
Since tort principles traditionally have governed actions for wrongful
death, 8 7 the most significant relationship test should be applied in death
actions.' 8 8 However, because wrongful death is a statutory cause of action,
many courts have been less willing to abandon the vested rights approach
in this area. Most courts have held that no cause of action for wrongful
death exists unless it was created by the law of the place of wrong. Courts
fear that to depart from lex loci would mean giving extra-territorial effect
to a state statute.' 89 In Husted v. Missouri Pacific Ry. 9o the Missouri court
applied the local law of the state of conduct and injury to determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties in an action for wrongful death. Decedent
Missouri resident was unloading coal cars in defendant's Kansas yards. The
car in which decedent was working was negligently pushed over an incline
causing it to collide with several other cars. The resulting impact threw
decedent from the car to his death. Decedent's brothers and sisters sued
182. See id. § 167, comment c.
183. Id. § 167, comment d.
184. 296 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1956).
185. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) § 167, comment d.
186. Id. §§ 175-80.
187. 2 R. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 24 (1956); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 126 (4th ed. 1971).
188. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 175, comment a.
189. R. LEFLAR, supra note 160, § 139.
190. 143 Mo. App. 623, 128 S.W. 282 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
1_972.]
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the railroad in Missouri. Under the law of Kansas, decedent was under
no obligation to support plaintiffs, although they lived on his farm. The
court applied the law of Kansas in holding the verdict excessive, in that
plaintiffs only had the right to recover their pecuniary loss.
The Restatement (Second) states that the law of the state of injury
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties in a wrongful death action
unless, with respect to a particular issue, some other state has a more sig-
nificant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.' 9 ' In the Restate-
ment (Second) the same principles control choice of law for both personal
injuries and wrongful death.102 The place of injury is defined as the place
where the force set in motion by the actor first takes effect. This is not
necessarily the state of death or the state of pecuniary loss.' 93 WVhether
another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties with respect to a particular wrongful death issue will depend on
whether another state has an interest in the determination of this particular
question. The extent of the interest of each concerned state should be deter-
mined in light of the policies of the local law rules. The probability that
a state other than the state of injury will be the state of the most significant
relationship is greater where the state of injury bears little relation to the
occurrence and the parties.194
In most cases the state of conduct and the state of injury will be the
same. This state's law will usually control most wrongful death issues.' 95
If conduct and injury occur in different states, the local law of the state
of injury will usually control. The likelihood is greater that the law of
the state of injury will be applied if the decedent had a settled relationship
with that state. If the decedent was domiciled, or resided or did business
in the state of conduct, this state will probably have the most significant
relationship. The same could be said if the injury occurred during an
activity or relationship centered in the state of conduct, and the decedent
had no settled relationship with the state of injury. When these two ele-
ments are found in the same case, the state of conduct will almost certainly
be the state of the most significant relationship. When conduct and injury
occur in different states it is quite possible that a third state may be that
of the most significant relationship.' 98
The Missouri courts have applied the law of the place of tort to deter-
mine both the amount recoverable' 97 and who is entitled to receive this
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 175.
192. Id. § 175, comment a.
193. Id. § 175, comment b.
194. Id. § 175, comment d.
195. Id. § 175, comment e.
196. Id. § 175, comment f.
197. See Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 266 Mo. 19. 178 S.W. 885 (1915); Byram v.
East St. Louis Ry., 39 S.W.2d 376 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931); Jackson v. St. Louis-
S.F. Ry., 224 Mo. App. 601, 31 S.W.2d 250 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930); Buchholz v.
Standard Oil Co., 211 Mo. App. 397, 244 S.W. 973 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922); Beckner
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amount beneficially.198 If the cause of action for wrongful death owes its
existence to a particular state's law, both ownership and size would seem
to be aspects of this same cause of action. Still, the policy considerations
that bear on one issue may be different from those that bear on another
issue in the same case. If these issues can be logically separated it may be
desirable to hold the validity of the cause of action controlled by one law,
and such issues as damages and ownership controlled by another law.' 99
In Chapman v. Terminal R.R.2oo the administrator of the estate of
William Foy sued in Missouri for Foy's wrongful death. Foy's death occurred
in Illinois where defendant's locomotive struck the automobile in which
Foy was a guest. The defendant argued that Foy's minority should limit the
recovery allowed. Under an Illinois statute, the jury was not confined in
its assessment of damages to the value of the services of decedent until he
would have reached majority. The jury could consider the continuance
of his life, and the benefits to be derived by his next of kin after majority
had been reached. The court held that the measure of damages was con-
trolled by the law of the place where the cause of action accrued-Illinois.
Under the Restatement (Second) the most significant relationship test
is applied to determine both the measure of damages for wrongful death 201
and the beneficial ownership of the cause of action. 202 The state of conduct
and injury will not by virtue of these contacts alone be the state of the
most significant relationship with respect to either of these issues. How-
ever, the law of this state will usually control. If one state is the domicile
of the defendant, decedent, and beneficiaries it would seem that the wrong-
ful death statute of this state should be applied.203 The applicable law will
198. See Charlton v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 200 Mo. 413, 98 S.W. 529 (1906);
Riley v. Grand Island Receivers, 72 Mo. App. 280 (K.C. Ct. App. 1897); Stoeck-
man v. Terre Haute & I. R.R., 15 Mo. App. 503 (St. L. Ct. App. 1884). See generally
Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 1129 (1963).
199. R. LEFLAR, supra note 160, § 139.
200. 156 Mo. App. 603, 137 S.W.2d 612 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940).
201. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 178.
202. Id. § 177.
203. Id. § 177, comment b; § 178, comment b. A predecessor to the Babcock
decision, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), suggests that some courts will regard the relationship contacts(the parties' domicile and the center of the parties' relationship) as having the
most qualitative significance with respect to an issue involving a statutory limit
on damages for wrongful death. In the Kilberg case the decedent met his death
when defendant's commercial airplane, on which he was a passenger, crashed.
The decedent had been a resident of New York, where his relationship with the
defendant airline had originated. The plane had taken off from a New York air-
port but crashed in Massachusetts. The application of the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute would have limited the plaintiff's possible recovery to 15,000. In
the ensuing wrongful death action brought in New York, the court applied the
law of the forum, which imposed no such limitation. Although Kilberg purportedly
was decided under the traditional approach (the court employed an escape device
to enable the application of New York law), a portion of the dicta contained in
the opinion is relevant at this juncture:
Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling
citizen of this State to the varying laws of other States through and over
which they move .... An air traveler from New York may in a flight of
a few hours' duration pass through several. . . commonwealths [that limit
1972.]
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control: whether there are any limitations on the amount of recovery;
whether punitive damages should be awarded; and whether there can be
recovery for particular elements of damage. 204 Likewise, the selected law
will determine who the beneficiaries are and the measure of their re-
covery.205
The problem of determining the proper party to maintain a multi-
state wrongful death action has caused confusion. Courts have held that
ownership of the right is an aspect of the cause of action, controlled by
the law creating the right. Arguably, this included only beneficial and not
the technical ownership vested in the nominal plaintiff. The designation
of a person to bring suit in the controlling wrongful death act does not
refer solely to the administrator or executor appointed at the place of
wrong. Any person who satisfied the controlling act's description of the
proper person to bring suit could maintain the action. Thus, an adminis-
trator appointed at the forum could maintain the action, although he
held the proceeds solely for the beneficiaries designated in the controlling
statute.206
If the statute of the place of wrong designated a particular person as
the one to sue upon the claim, that person could sue in Missouri.20 7 If the
statute provided that suit for death should be brought by the personal
representative of deceased, recovery was only allowed by a person qualified
to sue at the forum. 208 In Stipetich v. Security Stove & Mfg. Co. 20° the
parents of a minor decedent sought to sue for the child's wrongful death
resulting from the negligence of defendant's servant in driving a delivery
truck. Although Kansas was the situs of the tort and the plaintiff's residence,
suit was brought in Missouri. The Kansas statute gave a cause of action
for wrongful death to the next of kin of deceased, subject to certain lixnita-
tions. Under the common law of Kansas the phrase "next of kin" meant
the persons who inherit decedent's personal property. The Kansas statute
damage awards for wrongful death]. His plane may meet with disaster in
a State he never intended to cross but into which the plane has flown
because of bad weather or other unexpected developments, or an air-
plane's catastrophic descent may begin in one State and end in another.
The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous. Our courts should if
possible provide protection for our own State's people against unfair and
anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters.
9 N.Y.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135. Although contained in
a case purportedly decided under the traditional system, this language seems to
indicate that the New York court would regard the relationship contacts as having
the most qualitative significance on the damage limitation issue.
204. RESTATEATENT (SECOND) § 178, comment a.
205. Id. § 177, comment a.
206. R. LEFLAR, supra note 160, § 139.
207. See Diarotti v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 262 Mo. 1, 170 S.W. 865 (1914); Lee v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 195 Mo. 400, 92 S.W. 614 (1906); Jones v. Kansas City, F.S. &
M. R.R., 178 Mo. 528, 77 S.W. 890 (1903); Keele v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 151 Mo.
App. 364, 131 S.W. 730 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
208. See Richter v. East St. Louis & S. Ry., 20 F.2d 220 (W.D. Mo. 1927);
Willgues v. Pennsylvania R.R., 318 Mo. 28, 298 S.W. 817 (1927); Shaw v. Chicago
& A. R.R., 314 Mo. 123, 282 S.W. 416 (1926); Kelly v. Union Pac. Ry., 141 Mo.
App. 490, 125 S.W. 818 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
209. 218 S.W. 964 (K.C. Mo. App. 1920).
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on intestate succession provided that the intestate's personal property, if
there was no wife nor surviving issue, went to his parents. Applying the
law of Kansas, the Missouri court held that if there was a cause of action
it was in the parents.
If the wrongful death statute chosen by use of the most significant
relationship test designates a particular person to sue upon the claim, other
than the personal representative, such other person may sue thereon in
any state. 210 Only the person designated in this statute will be permitted
to sue on the claim.21 ' The state of conduct and injury will usually have
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. How-
ever, this state's law will not be chosen by virtue of these contacts alone.
If a single state is the domicile of the decedent and beneficiaries, or of the
defendant and beneficiaries, its wrongful death statute should usually
be applied to determine who may bring the action. 212
When the controlling death statute provides without further qualifica-
tion that the wrongful death action shall be brought by decedent's personal
representative, there will be a question as to which representative may
maintain the action. In some situations representatives may have been
appointed in two or more states.213 If recovery under the controlling statute
is for the benefit of individual beneficiaries and no personal representative
has been appointed in the forum state, a personal representative appointed
in any interested state may sue upon the claim. 214 However, if recovery
under the statute is for the benefit of decedent's estate, only a personal
representative qualified to sue under the law of the forum may maintain
the action.21 5
Under the common law a personal representative could only sue in
the state of his appointment. This rule protected local creditors. However,
local creditors have no interest in a recovery which goes directly to in-
dividual beneficiaries and not into the decedent's estate. In such a situa-
tion, there should be no objection to permitting a foreign representative
to sue.2 16 If the recovery is for the benefit of the estate, local creditors have
an interest in the recovery. The interests of local creditors would be preju-
diced if a foreign representative sued successfully and then returned with
the proceeds to the state of appointment.217 This explains the distinction
drawn in the Restatement (Second) between personal representatives suing
for wrongful death to benefit named beneficiaries and personal representa-
tives suing for wrongful death to benefit decedent's estate.
V. CONCLUSION
When lex loci delicti was the tort choice of law rule in Missouri,
attorneys naturally first sought the law which supported their client. If
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 179.
211. Id. § 179, comment b.
212. Id. § 179, comment c.
213. Id. § 180, comment a.
214. Id. § 180 (a).
215. Id. § 180 (b).
216. Id. § 180, comment b.
217. Id. § 180, comment c.
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application of that law was unavailable under the mechanical jurisdiction-
selecting rule, they sought an escape device that would allow the court to
apply this law. In court, the attorney first presented the lex loci doctrine
or selected escape device calling for the application of the law of a certain
state. Then he would point out that this law supported the position of
his client.218
A similar process is followed under the most significant relationship
test. Instead of resorting to lex loci or an appropriate escape device, at-
torneys must emphasize contacts, policies and other factors that will lead
a court to apply the desired law. Argument may embrace a wide range of
matters showing interests beyond those of mere physical contacts, especially
when these contacts favor the opponent. Argument of the superiority of
a law should not be overlooked. If the law of another state favors his client,
the attorney must demonstrate that justice will best be served by applying
the foreign law in this instance. At the same time, courts like to maintain
some consistency of result reached on similar facts. An argument based on
stare decisis should not be avoided simply because Missouri follows the
Restatement (Second). Forum shopping is a frequent criticism of the most
significant relationship test, and, while such an argument might not be
formalized in a court's opinion, it touches a sensitive area and could turn
a court against even a meritorious case.219
The adoption of the most significant relationship test in Missouri seems
to have given counsel more flexibility in selecting forums, remedies and
available rules of law. As a practical matter, an attorney has a much better
chance of getting a certain rule accepted as applicable if it is also the rule of
the forum. Thus, an attorney has an advantage if he can sue in a jurisdic-
tion that normally applies the rule for which he is arguing.2 20
These changes in tort choice of law partly reflect changes in national
life. State boundaries have less significance today because of the increased
mobility of our population. Men have an increasing tendency to conduct
their affairs across state lines. These changes also reflect a changed attitude
on the part of the courts; judges are more willing than before to consider
the basic values and policies underlying choice of law. Courts today give
greater weight to choice of law policies than to the demands of arbitrary
legal theory.22 1 Certain problems persist in the eclectic approach of the
Restatement (Second); however, the theory should provide a foundation
upon which a tort choice of law system can be constructed that reflects
the needs of contemporary society.
SANBORN N. BALL
218. Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603, 612 (1970).
219. Id. at 612-13.
220. See id. at 613.
221. rESTATEMENT (SECOND) 413.
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